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In 2000 an ambitious new process of transitional justice was launched in Rwanda as a
way to adjudicate crimes related to the genocide of 1994 at a local level. It took the name gacaca
(“justice on the grass”) from the traditional village courts on which it was based and between
2006-2010, almost one million cases were heard at gacaca courts throughout the country. Each
court was led by a council of elected “people of integrity ” and it considered a range of crimes,
from thefts to murder, connected to the genocide; it also required the participation of all residents
who, using informal language, voiced accusations, defended themselves, and served as
witnesses. Gacaca was ambitious not just in scope, but also in the expectation that an informal
process without the mediation of the legal experts could lead to outcomes perceived as legitimate
both inside and outside of Rwanda. Now, after the conclusion of gacaca, the evaluations of its
success are harsh and focus on the ways it failed to adequately punish perpetrators and became a
tool of increasingly authoritarian propaganda about a unified Rwanda. While the critiques are
well founded, I suggest that there are promising lessons from gacaca that are being overlooked in
the scholarship and can be applied to normative models of justice and citizenship.
I will argue that in its ideal conception the process of gacaca could have been a
productive response to two of the biggest challenges that face scholars of transitional justice. The
first is the question of how to balance the needs of punishment with the challenge of
strengthening the various relationships affected by the crime—this is the tension between
retributive and restorative justice— and the second is the question of how to provide a direct link
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between the work done during institutions of transitional justice and the possibility for
cooperation and new alliances in the period that follows. The paper begins by considering the
trajectory of the scholarship of gacaca, then considers its identity as a hybrid institution of justice
that has divergent goals, and lastly looks at the case of Joanita Mukarusunga, whose experiences
during gacaca serve as a compelling example of the benefits I am advocating.

The Three Stages
Thus far there have been three moments in the scholarship about the gacaca process in
Rwanda and they are consistent with a familiar arc in regards to political institutions: the
conventional wisdom has moved from tentative hopefulness to skepticism to disappointment. In
my schematic, the first stage refers to the time early on in the process, before the courts had been
fully implemented and the strengths and drawbacks of gacaca were conceptual, the second stage
is where mixed responses to its effectiveness and impact began to be pronounced, and the third
and current phase is marked by sustained and extensive criticism of the process as a failed
experiment. I do not deny the critiques that have motivated the third wave, nor do I want to go
back to the naïve optimism of the first stage, but the ideals allowed by the innovative structure of
gacaca are still useful ways of envisioning what is possible during transitional justice.
The idea of using a traditional form of conflict resolution in villages as a response to the
violence of 1994 did not emerge right away. 1 Rather, the national courts and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), held in Arusha, Tanzania, were the primary formal
mechanisms of punishment, but several reasons emerged to make a revised version of gacaca a
possibility. 2 First, the existing institutions were not adjudicating the offenders quickly enough;
over 100,000 were arrested shortly after the genocide and were being held in jail. 3 Up to 750,000
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were eventually charged once property crimes were also included and there was no way that the
national courts could manage the caseload. 4 The ICTR, funded by the United Nations, was only
meant for the most influential and strategic leaders of the genocide and by April of 2011, 55
cases had been completed and 20 more were awaiting trial. 5 Second, President Paul Kagame’s
government saw in gacaca an opportunity to shape public opinion at the local level. 6 Kagame, a
former leader of the Tutsi-based RPF, knew that his legitimacy, particularly in the rest of the
world, would be connected to how he led a national response to the crimes of 1994. One aspect
of this leadership was his commitment to a particular narrative of the genocide that emphasized
that colonial powers were to blame for inscribing the categories of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa into
everyday life and making them the basis of privilege. In reaction, the new Rwanda would be free
of these categories, at least at the discursive level, and this perspective was formally codified in
laws banning speech that promoted “divisionism.” The charge is notoriously vague and could be
used as a way to silence political opposition. The UNHCR describes the divisionist legislations
as the following: "The use of any speech, written statement, or action that divides people, that is
likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes an uprising which might degenerate into
strife among people based on discrimination." 7 The ambiguity inherent in the legislation was
interpreted to mean that all speech which referred to an ethnic identity could potentially
punishable by law. 8 Lastly, implementing gacaca would be a way to show the applicability and
resilience of local responses to conflict.
In the eyes of its proponents, the purposes of gacaca, as listed on the official website,
were broad and multi-faceted: (1) To reveal the truth of what happened, (2) To speed up legal
proceedings, (3) To eradicate the culture of impunity, (4) To build reconciliation and unity, and
(5) To prove that the Rwandan society has the capacity to settle its own problems through a
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system of justice based on Rwandan customary law. 9 It is clear from this list that the goals of
gacaca were not purely based on retributive ideas of punishment for particular crimes, the
legitimacy of the state, as well as the creation of a new political culture (although not an
explicitly democratic one) was also at stake. On a logistical level, the structure of gacaca was
impressive, with the country divided into 10,000 cells, each with its own gacaca court and
formalized appeals process. 10 Each cell elected people of integrity, the inyangamugayo, 254,000
in total, to act as judges and determine guilt and punishment. 11 They were not compensated for
their work. It is important to note that women were elected as well, even though they were not
included in the traditional format. The gacaca courts met weekly and attendance was required;
this marked a change from other large institutions of transitional justice like the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa where only a fraction of the country was directly
involved. While mandatory participation has been chronicled by scholars to have been
considered a burden, and the threat of fines necessary for enforcement, it is difficult to imagine
extensive participation otherwise and it is the basis for my argument about the possibilities of
trust. 12
In the spirit of gacaca as a local institution of conflict resolution, it was designed to be an
informal process where each person could act as the prosecution or defense and would represent
themselves without legal counsel as intermediaries. From the beginning, the stipulation that legal
counsel would not be a part of the gacaca process met with skepticism on the part of the
international human rights community, notably Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International,
who registered concerns that a defendant’s rights to a fair trial would be compromised because of
false accusations and unfounded punishments. 13 They also highlighted concerns about the impact
of a lack of knowledge about the judicial system and the potential for bias. These criticisms of
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gacaca later led to a debate about whether focusing on formal rights was a way to emphasize
western standards of legalism rather than accepting gacaca as a Rwandan institution with its own
history and norms. 14 The debate is no longer active largely because the criticisms have become
so far-reaching. A charge of Western bias, even if true, can only account for small number of the
concerns that have plagued the proceedings. In short, from its inception, critics feared that the
multiple goals of gacaca would provide a façade for a show trial that would serve primarily to
validate the political power of the RPF and the leadership of Paul Kagame. In hindsight, many of
these fears have been realized.
As the process began to be implemented, first with a pilot program and then with the full
roster of courts, the criticism of gacaca began to be more pronounced (this is the period I refer to
as the second stage). 15 Legal restrictions on speech were made more explicit and the ingando reeducation camps became a central mechanism for disseminating the official narrative. 16 These
camps, mandatory for perpetrators who wanted to enter society after being in prison, as well as
schoolchildren and others were a way to indoctrinate individuals into thinking about the
genocide in a way that was consistent with the goals of the government. The camps facilitated
enforcement of laws concerning divisionism and education in a revised version of Rwandan
history. It also became clear during this period that the courts would only consider Hutu crimes
against Tutsi during the genocide and not RPF crimes against Hutus and others during the civil
war. 17 Hutu suffering did not fit with narratives of the colonial legacy and even positing
moderate Hutus as the exception was seen as a threat to the sanctioned narrative. The highly
publicized denunciation by the state of Paul Rusebegina, the hotel manager at the Hotel des
Milles Collines, depicted in the film Hotel Rwanda, as a self-serving entrepreneur is one example
of Kagame’s to minimize the achievement of Hutus. 18 Adding to the criticisms were charges of
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corrupt judges and insensitivity to sexual violence. 19 While this wave of scholarship may have
been tentative about proclaiming a fatalistic assessment, fears were mounting that the desire to
expedite the process of justice, along with Kagame’s increasing control of speech in civil society,
would overwhelm gacaca’s goals of documenting an accurate collective history and promoting
“reconciliation.” 20
The recent scholarship (the third stage) has become increasingly strident in its
characterization of gacaca as a failed project. 21 New data on false accusations, lack of interest in
attending the trials, and the perception that guilty individuals are not being punished (at all or
harshly enough) because they have confessed or offered to help identify the remains have fueled
the argument. Critics have also focused on how the international community granted legitimacy
to the process because gacaca was branded as a local response, even though its current
incarnation diverged from the traditional gacaca in significant ways. 22 Waldorf writes, “Gacaca’s
failings underscore the need to look past such Pan-Africanism rhetoric and distinguish clearly
between ‘locally driven’ conflict resolution and state-imposed informalism designed to expand
the state’s reach into local communities.” 23 To him and similar critics, gacaca is best understood
as a tool for state penetration under the cover of locally-derived legitimacy. Kasaija Phillip
Apuuli’s characterization is further representative of the third wave of scholarship:

The Gacaca jurisdiction, being rooted in popular tradition, profoundly compromises the
principles of due process as defined in human rights and criminal law instruments. The
deficiencies inherent in the process include: lack of separation between prosecutor and
judge; no legal counsel; no legally reasoned verdict; strong tendency towards selfincrimination; and a strong potential for major divergence in punishment. These
deficiencies have raised doubts about the mechanism and indeed the distrust of this
justice, has led to many Rwandans particularly of Hutu ethnic background, to flee from
it. 24
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Apuuli’s language is consistent with current perspective of gacaca that see the shortcomings as
so pronounced and impossible to ignore, that a discussion of its merits feels beside the point.
Official restrictions against the consideration of Tutsi war crimes have catalyzed the most serious
types of concern. The failure to recognize that Hutus have also suffered suggests that the gacaca
process may be fomenting resentment against Tutsi authority that will increase proportionately to
propaganda proclaiming Rwandan unity. While it may be premature to say that the gacaca
process will lead to ethnically motivated violence, it is important to recognize this dynamic as a
significant legacy of the process. The charge of divisionism continues to affect political life and
the legislation was evoked in relation to Kagame’s opponents during the election in 2010 once
again raising the question whether Kagame was using the language of reconciliation as a way to
obscure political repression and implement anti-democratic processes. 25 I suggest that the
exclusion of RPF crimes, along with the restrictions on speech, might be understood with
respect to Bonnie Honig’s concept of the remainder in which political stability is attempted by
closing off what is acceptable in terms of content and emotion within political life for the illusion
of consensus. 26 Yet, this closure can only be temporary because what is excluded will inevitably
return to the political realm. The form the remainder will take is uncertain, but Honig’s
formulation suggests that the remainder is always prefigured by structures of exclusion. The
manner and means of exclusion constitute the ideas and identities that will propel their way into
politics. In this case, the restrictions on what types of crimes are acceptable and the tacit
categorization of all Hutus as perpetrators will not be seamlessly assimilated into the propaganda
of one Rwanda, the expunged stories will somehow find their way back into political life.

Retributive v. Restorative Justice
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One of the biggest challenges of transitional justice is to simultaneously create and
adjudicate new norms regarding justice and political participation in the wake of a compromised
legal structure. Gacaca provides a fascinating case of an institution that included both retributive
and restorative elements in its implementation of new norms, a compromise that has long vexed
institutions of transitional justice. Despite its flaws, the type of restorative justice practiced in
gacaca has much to contribute to scholarly thinking about future approaches. Although the need
for both retributive and restorative approaches during periods of transitional justice is persuasive,
one approach is often used in the scholarly literature to criticize institutions that favor the other,
without the possibility of synthesis. While retributive justice is primarily concerned with the
punishment of the perpetrator, restorative justices takes the relationships between the perpetrator,
victim, bystander, and community as a central focus. Punishment may be a part of the process of
repairing relationships, but restorative justice conceives of the process of justice to be much
broader than the appropriate administration of punishment. Truth commissions, which do not
assign criminal punishment but emphasize testimony and documenting a collective history, are
the most prominent examples of restorative justice at the national level. In the introduction to
their edited volume on the subject, McLaughlin et. al write, “According to restorative justice
proponents, the established social system embodies and seeks to promote a dominant, traditional,
hierarchical, and ostensibly mechanistic mode of governance. Restorative justice envisages
radical transformation in favour of a 'Third Way,' that is partially decentralized, informal,
participatory and communitarian.” 27 Gacaca emerges as a strong example of restorative justice
because of its grounding in universal participation and informal language, as well as its goal of
building relationships between many different subgroups within the community. Gacaca was an
evocative case of restorative justice for two additional reasons. First, it responded to the assertion
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by critics that restorative justice is a return to pre-modern forms of justice, kadi justice in Max
Weber’s classification, plagued by irrationality and status hierarchy. 28 Just as the restorative
justice tradition as a whole emphasizes a return to the role of the community while still paying
attention to the formal ideals of equality and legal protection, gacaca itself was a re-envisioning
of an indigenous form of conflict resolution that neither glorifies nor disdains the role of the
community. The election of the inyangamugayo, people of integrity, not limited by gender or
age, was a challenge to entrenched hierarchies.
Secondly, gacaca demonstrated that restorative justice does not mean a complete lack of
retributive punishment. While the term emerged as a critique of purely retributive views of
punishment, it is not mutually exclusive from it and the local council of gacaca had the power to
punish. When examining restorative and retributive justice together, it becomes clear that tradeoffs are necessary because there is not one axis upon which the successful outcome will be
measured. Rather, there are several ways of thinking about proportionality and the
appropriateness of punishment in relationship to the possibility of greater trust between
participants or attention to the needs of the victim (such as the desire for a formal burial). These
decisions are made by those who have been elected by participants are embedded in the
community; they understand local customs and prejudices. For those who think that impartial
and strict guidelines for punishment (without plea bargains, etc.) are the most important purpose
of transitional justice and should never be compromised for other ends, institutions like gacaca
will never be persuasive. But for those who accept that compromises must be made when goals
are as divergent as they were in the case of gacaca, a different calculation is necessary. This
acceptance that institutions of transitional justice can include both approaches to justice within
the process is surprisingly novel but this entails, however, the need for a different set of criteria
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by which to justice the effectiveness of the process. This may be impossible in the direct
aftermath of the proceedings.

Deliberative and Agonistic Conceptions
Gacaca also acts as a hybrid between two understandings of what constitutes legitimate
democratic debate. The distinction between retributive and restorative justice refers to the legal
orientation of the institution while that of deliberative versus agonistic democracy is concerned
with the political practices of the demos. Within political theory the agonistic approach to
politics is often contrasted with deliberative democratic models and the distinction stems from a
debate over what types of communication are desirable within political communication, as well
as the goals of this endeavor. Deliberative democrats emphasize the power of reasonable
arguments and persuasion to achieve the goal of political decisions most can agree with (the
mandate of consensus is a straw man when talking about deliberative politics, but works as a
regulative ideal). 29 The central challenge for politics, they argue, is to arrive at a mutually
beneficial and rationally justifiable decision about how to proceed despite disparate interests and
in a manner that is inclusive of a wide range of participants. Procedural safeguards, such as
described in Habermas’s ideal speech situation, act as norms to balance inclusion with
compromise. Agonistic thinkers, such as Chantal Mouffe, Bonnie Honig, William Connolly and
others, have been frustrated with what seems to be lost or overlooked in this approach to
politics. 30 Namely, it is the spirit of the agon, strife, and the struggle between competing interests
that should make up the proper content of political debate. The dictates of reasonable
argumentation within deliberative democracy suggest that all perspectives, properly formulated,
are given an equal change at success. An agonistic approach would find the idea of “proper
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formulation” unacceptably limiting because of the restrictions on the types of communication
allowed, such as those grounded in the passions. Instead, an agonistic approach would want to
excise the ideal of consensus altogether and accept that communication will include emotional,
visceral, and passionate expression. Furthermore, an agonistic approach wants to draw attention
to the remainders of politics and the need for direct engagement with it.
Agonistic politics, by its very presupposition, is difficult to institutionalize. It seems that
any time formal mechanisms and constraints are put into place, the openness and contestation
desired by proponents of agonism is lost. Easier to imagine, then, are incidents of noninstitutionalized democracy: public demonstrations and protests that refuse to abide by
established restrictions. In other work, I have suggested that victim testimony at truth
commissions can be consistent with agonistic aspirations, provided that the commission is open
and responsive to the most volatile and difficult emotions, notably anger, that have had an
uneasy place in previous iterations. 31 Still, the incorporation of agonistic theory into actual
practice, especially during transitional justice, is a conundrum.
Because of the nature of the criticism, the gacaca process is not an obvious choice for a
discussion of agonistic politics, but I suggest that there could have been significant agonistic
moments built into the process apart from the adversarial aspects of the criminal jurisprudence.
These would have been moments to contest the official narrative promoted by the state through
open discussion about the legacy of the genocide and the war crimes committed by the RPF, as
well as a consideration of the ongoing effects of the categories of Hutu and Tutsi despite the
rhetoric of a unified Rwanda. Such forums would also have been a space to express frustration at
the lack of punishment or the fear of false accusations. These discussions would have embodied
the spirit of agonistic democracy in that they would represent pluralistic and contestatory
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perspectives not given attention elsewhere and central to the process of reckoning within
transitional justice. More so than the other transitional justice institutions that have been
established, the structure of gacaca could have allowed for an agonistic exchanges and yet, it
also shows how they can be made to be tools of the state. To prevent this outcome, liberal
democratic protections, such as those related to defendant rights are necessary. For agonistic
ideals to be incorporated into formal institutions of transitional justice, special attention must be
paid to the ways it can easily become co-opted (through censorship) or misdirected, protections
of individual rights can be the countervailing force. The concerns of deliberative democrats thus
do not go unheeded in the possibility of an agonistic forum; they are reminders of corruptibility
and the need for liberal protections, but an agonistic framework is more appropriate for post-war
political life because of the reality of conflicting accounts, the role of emotion, and its
incorporation of upheaval as procedurally desirable.
Organizing this type of agonistic event at a national level is overwhelming and
potentially chaotic, but at the level of gacaca it was a much more plausible undertaking. While
the outcome of these discussions would not have been tied to an official decision, it should have
been recorded and consulted in reference to future political actions. The concern with
envisioning gacaca as this type of forum would be, as it often is in relation to potentially
disruptive debate, that the agonistic atmosphere would undermine the functioning of the gacaca
process by introducing subversive opinions. The agonistic component of discussion is exactly
what the state may fear even as it is setting up an otherwise ambitious model of debate. This is
the fear that an open airing of grievance of all types would puncture the legitimacy and make it
difficult to proceed, but this is a risk that is necessary to allow the process to be participatory and
inclusive of perspectives that are likely to become the remainder. In addition, the fact that gacaca
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was grounded in repeated and informal interactions between citizens is an antidote to this
frequent criticism of agonistic spaces. To contribute to trust, as I discuss the below, the
divergences that may appear in agonistic exchanges should have the opportunity for
reconsideration over time. The upheaval must have a post-script.

32

I argue that gacaca’s

orientation toward allowing a participatory process (moment of open debate) to contribute to the
decision of the inyangamugayo (a closed decision) is a useful model for thinking about the
institutionalization of retributive and restorative justice as well as agonistic politics. 33
An agonistic struggle over the meaning of politics, impunity, and ethnicity was implied
by several of the functions of gacaca, as articulated at its inception, but to achieve it would
require a movement away from a narrow legalistic approach to the crimes and, even more
emphatically, a movement away from an atmosphere of censorship. Agonistic communication
requires a delicate balance— too much strife and it can become a chaotic altercation; too little
and the communication is either stifled or lacking impact. Gacaca could have been a great
example of this delicate balance. Gacaca as an example of agonistic politics is one that is
imagined rather than grounded in the reality of the process, but it is still an important
contribution to institutionalized visions of transitional justice. 34

The Value of Informal and Face-to-face Interactions
Research has shown that “communities organized solely or primarily around concerns
about crime are often short-lived” and I suggest that community involvement in crimes related to
genocide would be even more likely to follow this pattern. 35 However, the possibility of building
upon concern for past crimes in order to contribute to new types of relationships in everyday
political life is one of the contributions of the gacaca model. The fact that the discussion at

13

gacaca could lead neighbors to see each other as potential allies is a significant contribution,
even if it was only a rare occurrence. This connection has been hard to imagine in other types of
transitional justice institutions including war crimes trials and truth commissions.
I agree with scholars who connect the development of trust to shared vulnerability and
the chance to hold in one’s care what someone else views as important. 36 In his introduction to
an edited volume on trust, Mark E. Warren writes, “Trust involves a judgment, however implicit,
to accept vulnerability to the potential ill will of others by granting them discretionary power
over some good. When one trusts, one accepts some amount of risk for potential harm in
exchange for the benefits of cooperation.” 37 The risks to which he refers would be salient during
the gacaca process, but so too would be the process of judgment and the benefits of cooperation.
I suggest that this calculation between vulnerability and the benefits of cooperation is both
experienced firsthand and modeled normatively through the experience of gacaca. The question
of how to build trust within societies is one of the most difficult tasks faced by theorists of
transnational justice. With the case of trials, it is the legitimacy of the proceedings and the
commitment to “stay the hand of vengeance” as articulated by Robert Jackson at Nuremberg that
is meant to inspire trust in the proceedings, but it is not concerned with the relationship between
the accused and the victims, nor the interpersonal foundation for future political cooperation. 38
The primary relationship is between the accused and a formal institution and the trust that is
cultivated is a type of delegated trust directed to a third party or institutions.
What the format of gacaca could have fostered, at least in a few cases, is a type of direct
trust between individuals that is based on “wholly personal criteria in deciding the costs and
benefits of entering a relation of trust.” 39 With restorative justice more generally, the emphasis is
shifted to a direct interaction between the accused and victims with the help of a mediating party
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and the particular needs and emotions of the victim become part of the process. They are not
asked to make their claims consistent with formal rules that may have the danger of distorting the
claim itself. A victim is also able to see firsthand how the accused is choosing to defend herself
and react to this in a public way. This back and forth among different actors, drawing on past
experiences of negotiation and compromise becomes the foundation for trust. It is also
significant that these conversations take place over the course of repeated interactions. 40 This
allows trust to increase incrementally without the potential resentment of assumed solidarity or
strong ties from the beginning. Repeated, informal interactions between citizens also allow
individuals to use their existing skills and intuitive mechanisms for determining trustworthiness,
rather than relying on an intermediary institutions such as the media. They would also be able to
observe subtle changes over time, including the authenticity, or lack thereof, of confessions or
pleas for forgiveness. With these types of repeated interpersonal exchanges, many outcomes are
possible, including the worsening of relations. Yet, this uncertainty cannot be precluded, in order
to allow for the possibility of positively transformed relationships, transitional justice institutions
must take on the risk of negatively transformed ones, a possibility that becomes clear with the
examination of the agonistic characteristics of gacaca above.
Even with truth commissions, such as the South African TRC, informal and face-to-face
communication between citizens was impossible. Most people watched the events on TV or
listened on the radio and it was not the same community in the audience week after week. Also,
while the language of testimonies at the Human Rights Violations committee hearing at the TRC
was informal, the necessities of translation meant that it was difficult to communicate directly to
the commissioners and the audience. 41 The informal language of the proceedings at gacaca
seems to have been effective in preventing them from becoming dominated by elites. The lack of
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legal counsel was a consistent basis for criticism but it also ensured that the language, forms of
expression, and social norms emerged from the locality itself and not from distinctions based on
education or legal training. This is not to say that the power relationships within a community are
not reproduced within the procedure. Of course they are, and all participants may not feel equally
entitled to speak, although they have the formal right to do so. This is part of the argument for
the establishment of liberal individual rights as a precondition for agonistic debate and face-toface interactions based on equality. I still consider the conditions of gacaca to be highly
conducive for direct communication and, as I will explain below, the chance for a transformation
in the social roles which had been defined by the violence.
The justification for informal language brings to mind one of Jürgen Habermas’
contributions to democratic theory. While the decision to forgo formal legal representation was
consistent both with gacaca’s identity as an indigenous process of conflict resolution and with
the practical concerns about funding such a high number of criminal trials, it has resonances with
his emphasis on informal language, an important strand in the literature on deliberative
democracy. Habermas’s defense of the value of informal language has multiple valences, as it is
tied to his understanding of universal validity and the self-generating norms that emerge from a
process of rational debate. Furthermore, Habermas’s emphasis on the informal language of
practical discourse was, in part, a response to charges that oftentimes the formal constraints of
procedure and expert language fatally weaken the possibility of participation by all those
affected by a political concern, a prerequisite for democratic legitimacy. However, Thomas
McCarthy notes, "It is fundamental to discourse ethics that rightness claims have cognitive and
not merely volitional significance. Their validity, like the validity of truth claims, is based not on
de facto acceptance but on the soundness of the reasons that can be offered in support of them." 42
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With this approach of “cognitive” and not “volitional” validity, Habermas explicitly rejects a
more agonistic approach to deliberation, or its correlate in Richard Rorty's idea of abnormal
discourses which can be the basis for edification and new paradigms, precisely because they lack
the criteria for validity. 43 However, the hybrid nature of gacaca provided a way to
simultaneously activate two types of legitimacy. The agonistic forum, discussed above, would
not have been concerned with the closure on the basis of a shared will that emerges from
cognitively sound reasons. Its purpose would be distinct from that end. The legal validity of the
trials however have greater regulation, even with the expectations of informal language and
participation, but an agonistic forum would exist within broader parameters. Although it would
have occurred concurrently with the agonistic forum, the decision making process of the
inyangmugayo still depends on stricter rules for evidence and a culling of relevant observations
and sentiments.
My interpretation of the value of informal language in the gacaca process diverges from
both Habermas and Richard Rorty. Rather than being the basis for legitimate discussions or
edification, it is the basis for the possibility of transformed relationships between citizens. The
language of testimony is a way to interpret the event of the genocide but is also a reflection on
one's role in the new polity that is emerging in the transition. The lack of restrictions on the types
of speech that are acceptable allows for such a transformation to a new citizen identity.
One of the enduring critiques of testimony at truth commissions is the charge that
witnesses are only heard as victims who are passive recipients worthy of pity, but not political
agents who are seen as equals within political life. 44 Gacaca had the opportunity to challenge this
critique because of the ways that the legal process became an extension of social and political
life and allowed for a plurality of roles; the victim in one situation could also be a friend,
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witness, or the accused in another. In trials, the roles of victims, perpetrators and bystanders are
static. Their interaction within the institutional space is always mediated by this identity and this
is part of the limited set of possible outcomes at its conclusion. While the emotions felt with
regards to guilt or innocence may vary, the parameters of the decisions are already demarcated.
In the context of truth commissions where amnesty is not an issue, the purpose of testimony is
considerably broader and can include connections between past violence and future political
participation, as well as commentary on what would be required for future trust. Yet, because of
the national scale of the commission and the distance between the testimonies and actual
communities, the institution cannot lead to the actual praxis of cooperative action. By
cooperative action, I mean tasks or projects that arise from the discussions at gacaca. These
could be personal such as helping with child care or political as related to the terms of the
distribution of resources in the community. In the case I look at below, the transition to life
outside gacaca occurs when the members of the community meet to unearth the remains of
victims of the genocide after the end of a gacaca session.
The weekly gatherings that made up gacaca could have been more explicitly oriented to
citizenship relations in the future. In an ideal version, this orientation may become salient when,
for example, the proceedings revealed that many women in the village were looking for small
loans to start entrepreneurial projects but they were not available. If someone in the village is
either able to help directly or help arrange for a meeting with banks interested in micro-lending,
a new alliance could be formed. To put it another way, although the proceedings were concerned
with crimes of a particular period, the repeated interactions of participants, as well as the
openness to informal communication suggests that the process could have generated an
awareness of collective concerns and a chance for citizens to interact on issues other than those
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that concern the punishment of crimes. Further research is necessary to assess the extent to which
this was the case and the dynamic that followed. 45 Gacaca was not only about a re-creation of
factual evidence, but through repeated interactions, grounded in informal language, it was also a
way to allow a new political culture to emerge through the lived practices and participation of the
citizenry.

In the Tall Grass
The documentary In the Tall Grass produced and directed by J. Coll Metcalfe in 2006
focuses on a single case heard at the gacaca court of the Mugera province. Joanita Mukarusanga,
one of the few remaining Tutsis in the village, accuses her neighbor, Anastase Butera, a Hutu, of
murdering her husband and three children in April of 1994. While she was later able to bury her
husband, the bodies of her children had not been found. On the night in question, Joanita claims
that Anastase Butera came with a group of Hutu men and asked to see her husband’s identity
card, which confirmed that he was Tutsi, and then killed him with a club and machete. The next
day Joanita tried to run from the home with her children, but she says that Anastase Butera
followed her and asked another person, Karenzi, to kill the children. Karenzi refused but
Anastase Butera attacked Joanita with a machete until she fled. Then he attacked her children but
she was not witness to their murders. When Anastase responds to the accusations, he admits to
being at Joanita’s house and asking for the identity card, as well as using a nail-studded club
against Joanita’s husband, but he denies using a machete or injuring him or the children to the
point of death. Throughout his testimony, as they did with Joanita, audience members and
members of the inyangamugayo ask clarifying questions.
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During the next session, a neighbor comes forward and testifies that she saw Butera
chasing the children in front of the house and then throwing them in a ditch nearby, at which
point Joanita’s daughter was dead, but the others were buried alive.

46

The witness also says that

she knows where the remains are located. Butera is given the chance to respond to these charges
and maintains that he did not participate in the murders. After the proceedings conclude for the
day, a member of the audience suggests that they go to the site mentioned by the neighbor in
order to look for the bodies of Joanita’s children. This is an action taken by a group of neighbors
that is not formally connected to gacaca, but emerges from the information revealed therein.
The film then shifts to a scene of a group of villagers using shovels to unearth a grove of
banana trees. Butera is among them. They initially do not find the bodies, but the next morning,
the children’s bodies are found shallowly buried in a ditch close to Joanita’s home. It is Butera
who lifts out several of the remains and helps to rinse them to prepare them for the funeral,
while Joanita gives him instructions. Another scene shows three small wooden caskets with the
remains inside in preparation for a makeshift procession and funeral. During the funeral Joanita
stands toward the back of the group, visibly shocked and exhausted; she places three wooden
crosses on the graves.
Meanwhile, the inyangamugayo has met at a local schoolhouse and deliberated about the
outcome of the case. We see footage of several members saying that they believe Joanita is
telling the truth and that Butera was directly involved in the murders. The scene ends with the
one person saying that the council finds Butera to be worthy of a Category One classification,
that is, as a leader of the genocide. Due to the severity of the crime and the possibility for capital
punishment, the adjudication of Category One crimes is outside of the jurisdiction of gacaca and
happens only in national level courts. It is thus the recommendation of gacaca that he be re-
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arrested and tried at the higher court. We are not shown footage of him finding out about this
decision and as of April 2011, Butera had not been tried in the national courts. 47
In interpreting this case, I want to suggest that there was a compromise between
immediate retribution and restorative justice that was productive. It allowed for interactions
between citizens that could contribute to a political culture of increased trust in the future. The
relationship between Joanita and Anastase Butera, while not ideal, may be a realistic model for
what can be achieved through institutions of transitional justice. “The only way gacaca will work
is if Butera is brutally honest. That’s where I stand, ” Joanita says during the process, and this
type of demand, alongside a desire for punishment, often motivates victims during institutions of
transitional justice. They are, of course, two of the most difficult things for institutions to
achieve. This case shows that the participatory and informal nature of gacaca can lead to the
beginnings of trust even if these other two expectations are not fully met. While Joanita knew
that finding her children’s remains would bring her comfort, she could not have predicted how it
would shape the way she interacted with Butera and others, as well as how she perceived gacaca.
For Butera, too, it is striking to note that when he talks about receiving forgiveness or
punishment in the film, he implies that he had confessed to a murder during gacaca and is worthy
of mercy. This must be infuriating for all those involved because he made his case on not
confessing, on vehemently maintain his innocence, but the sentiment may be revealing of his
guilt. Butera did not want to confess to everything of which he was accused, but it seemed that
he did not want to further alienate his neighbors, either. His participation in the burial, while at
least partially instrumental to be sure, may also have been an opportunity for him to interact in a
constructive way with Joanita Mukarusanga and his neighbors. His involvement symbolized an
awareness that he will have to perform actions in order to begin to repair the relationships in this
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community. With the decision of the inyangamugayo, retributive justice was deferred to the
national level in this case and it is plausible to argue that there was a failure to punish and only
the goals of restorative justice were served. This is not accurate; the deferral was a sign of the
seriousness of the crimes and the need for punishment, if true. The threat of punishment was also
necessary for the information about the case to emerge from Joanita, her neighbor, and Butera
himself.
While Joanita, Anastase Butera, and her neighbor are giving testimony, it seems that their
roles in the community are fixed (as victim, accused, and bystander), as they would be in a trial
or a truth commission. In those institutions their interaction with each other would have been
circumscribed by what they offered to the evidence allowed by the trial or by their one
appearance on the witness stand at a truth commission. This assumption of fixed identities is
dramatically altered in gacaca in the scene where they are looking for the remains of Joanita’s
children. In this situation, a direct result of the neighbor’s testimony, a subgroup of the
participants at gacaca have gathered for a different purpose. Their identities have been
transformed, Joanita is still the mother of the victim, but she is also a fellow villager who needs
help in the present. Anastase Butera is the accused, but also an ally. The presence of Anastase is
initially startling and immediately raised the question of his motives. He seems insistent on
helping and is at the center of the mission when the bones are found. Speaking directly to the
camera, Joanita say that she hopes his involvement with lead to “a change of heart.” This
indicates that she continues to believe that he is responsible, and his confession would still give
her some comfort. We do not get a parallel interview with him revealing how he understands his
involvement.
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The Beginning of Trust
At the beginning of the film, Joanita says to the interviewer that she cannot be outside her
home after dark because she is afraid that Anastase Butera will kill her so as to silence her
testimony. This statement brings to the foreground what is at stake in this hybrid process of
justice where the process of accusing someone is informal, but the consequences may be severe,
and possibly violent. This sentiment of fear continues through the film, but after the funeral for
her children, Joanita says, “I was very afraid, but today not so.” This statement has multiple
interpretations, but it is Joanita’s transformation from fear to the beginnings of trust that may be
most evocative of the potential that was present in gacaca. One interpretation of her statement
could be that she was haunted by not knowing where her children were buried and this
uncertainty was worse than a confirmation that Anastase Butera, her neighbor, was the killer.
Another interpretation is that the involvement of Anastase Butera in the unearthing of the bodies
caused her to be less fearful of him, although she was still frustrated by his denial of
responsibility. By participating in the collective activity of the search, Butera may have indicated
a desire and willingness to engage with Joanita and the rest of the community in a new way and
thus mitigated her lingering fears. A cynical reading would be that he was using his participation
as a way to shed his perpetrator identity without punishment. This may be true, but if the fluidity
of identity is thought to be desirable for victims, as I suggest it is, we should also consider the
implications of this possibility for perpetrators. A local process such as gacaca is better
positioned to consider the costs and benefits of this fluidity and this discretion could also be the
source of abuse. Still, Butera’s apparent role as a leader in the killings arguably make him a poor
candidate for transformation but it raises the question, if punishment is unlikely or not feasible,
what is the next best solution for how a community should treat perpetrators? The case of Butera
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is useful for thinking about the challenges living in a peaceable way, with, at least, some of the
perpetrators, whether they were released as a result of time already served or the result of a plea
bargain. The feeling that perpetrators have not been adequately punished is almost always a
concern for societies after mass violence, and a legitimate one, but it may also be a hindrance to
political cooperation and new alliances within a community.

After the Trial
Reflecting on the process, Joanita says that she values gacaca because “We talk and then
go our own ways.” It is hard to tell, because of context and translation, whether she is suggesting
that her involvement with her fellow villagers has been distant in the aftermath of the case. If so,
this may challenge my interpretation of it as a pivotal moment in changing patterns of
interaction. It may also mean that gacaca is all the more necessary as a forum for addressing
issues related to the genocide that would live in silence otherwise. Joanita’s comment might also
suggest that this task of adjudication does not need to be all encompassing for the community for
days and weeks at a time. It is important during a certain period, but a preoccupation with the
case should be limited and not define all future interactions. 48
The case presented in In the Tall Grass could be said to exist in tension with my
arguments about the possibility of informal communication and the possibility of new alliances
as it suggests some skepticism about the general applicability of the case. The lack of an
agonistic exchange and the ambiguousness of the outcome are important to note. Waldorf claims
that, on the whole, very little emotion was on display during gacaca and he suggests that this is
consistent with narratives encouraged by the official discourse connected to gacaca and the ones
that are excluded by the culture of censorship around the topic of ethnic identity. Joanita’s
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testimony is restrained in terms of emotion, it is mostly sadness and resignation at the
devastating loss of her family that is affectively communicated. She begins to cry while
describing what has happened and while describing how she feels about Anastase Butera. The
tribunal and the audience do not intervene when this happens, but let her finish speaking when
she is ready. Anastase Butera speaks with notes and seems somewhat anxious in his demeanor.
After he says that he was present but not responsible for the killing, audience members listen
attentively and ask follow-up questions about the weapon he was carrying and the precise nature
of his involvement. There is a contentious back-and-forth with the inyangamugayo after they are
visibly incredulous at his account. When Joanita’s neighbor comes forward, she speaks without
much emotion.
One could also suggest that the case featured in In the Tall Grass is less novel than it first
appears and is in line with the strong desire for families of victims to have their remains and give
a proper burial. From Antigone to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the
desire for formal mourning has always been prominent after mass violence and this case is no
exception. 49 In this way, the circumstances of the case may speak less to the possibility of new
alliances than the fact that punishment has often been leveraged in order to recover the truth
about how someone died and where the body is located. The movement between gacaca and the
search for the bones is not as significant to a larger argument about political culture because it is
the exceptional case. One might argue that the search was an extension of the trial and the
cooperation that was present is directly related to Joanita’s status as the victim in the trial. I agree
that the desire for a proper funeral and burial is exceptional and, in many ways, is the least
controversial type of demand that a victim can make. Even those who disagree on the legitimacy
of the violence that led to the deaths may be sympathetic to the desire to find the remains. Still,
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even though it may not represent the forward-looking political alliance I suggest is possible, it is
a substantial move in that direction. The move from the formal space of the gacaca trial to the
informal mission to find the remains is indicative of the substantial possibilities for new patterns
of citizenship within the gacaca process.

On the Role of Legal Representation
The footage of Anastase Butera defending himself raises the hypothetical question about
what the influence of legal counsel may have been. Is seems that his demeanor as well as the
inconsistencies in his story about how directly he was involved led the tribunal to doubt his
story. He could not provide an alternative account of the murders. The other people who were
references (Karenzi, among others) have passed away or otherwise not able to participate. A
formal legal defense would likely have been able to tell a more consistent story about his
involvement, or, perhaps, tried to use a confession to change the terms of the punishment, if they
thought a Category One classification was likely. At the conclusion of the film, we are led to
believe that he will have his chance for formal representation if and when he stands trial in the
national court. However, in an ironic twist, Butera may have had the winning strategy. By
achieving the Category One classification, Butera was not punished at gacaca and thus far, not
been tried in the national courts. Although he spent some time in jail waiting for a trial in
national court, he has been released. 50

The gacaca process was undeniably flawed in its execution and the implications of these
flaws may have a profound impact on future violence in Rwanda. The process may not appear to
directly contribute to future violence, but the evidence suggests greater authoritarian control over
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speech and the semblance of victor’s justice. Yet, the structure of gacaca is still a useful way to
imagine the possibilities for greater trust and new alliances between citizens. In light of this, the
scholarly community interested in gacaca should have two goals, the first is to examine the
potential that existed in the process of gacaca separate from the two major criticisms of the
coercive influence of the laws against divisionism and the exclusion of RPF crimes. The second
goal is to investigate particular moments that were promising as a way to build interpersonal
trust. The moment when Butera participated in the unearthing of the bodies of Joanita’s children
captures the unique contribution of gacaca as a hybrid process of justice, not purely retrospective
and retributive, but also the foundation for a future political culture not beholden to old relations
of power. I am not saying that these possibilities were achieved in every case, or even in most
cases, I cannot judge this, and the ethnographic research suggests otherwise. Still, possibilities
for incorporating agonistic concerns and fostering interpersonal trust were present in ways we
have not seen before in institutions of transitional justice on this scale, and this, at least, is a
reason to investigate further.
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